With Donald Trump returning to the White House, Europe is set to face an uncomfortable reckoning: years of complacency and underinvestment in defense will no longer go unchallenged. Europe has long relied on the United States to carry the lion’s share of NATO’s defense burden, particularly as Russia once again threatens the continent’s security. While Europe has taken incremental steps since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, these are too little and, quite possibly, too late. Now, Trump’s administration is likely to demand that Europe finally shoulder its share—or risk facing a crisis alone.
The facts are stark. Before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, European NATO members were notoriously behind on defense spending. In 2021, just six of NATO’s 30 members met the 2% GDP defense spending target, a goal that was agreed upon to ensure that all members could make substantial contributions to collective defense. That year, the European Union collectively spent approximately €226 billion on military defense—a number that pales in comparison to the United States’ $705 billion Department of Defense budget for the same year. Despite the EU27’s economy being only 4% smaller than that of the U.S., Europe has relied heavily on American defense spending, with the U.S. funding approximately 68% of NATO’s total budget by 2023. In contrast, Germany—Europe’s largest economy—has been one of the most reluctant to meet NATO’s defense targets.
Trump repeatedly called out this disparity in his first term, highlighting that NATO was essentially operating as a vehicle for U.S. security commitments to Europe without proportionate buy-in from its European allies. Trump’s rhetoric raised alarms, but ultimately, the status quo remained: Europe assumed the U.S. would always step in if needed. Germany, for instance, put economic growth and cheaper energy from Russia at the forefront of its agenda, even as NATO’s defense standards went unmet. In 2011, then-Chancellor Angela Merkel announced plans to phase out nuclear power in Germany by 2022, choosing to replace this energy with cheap natural gas from Russia. While this decision saved costs domestically, it increased Germany’s—and, by
extension, Europe’s—dependence on Russian energy, despite rising tensions between NATO and Moscow while also giving Putin the financial resources to rebuild his military.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 should have been a wake-up call. Suddenly, the threat that the United States had been cautioning against for years materialized on Europe’s doorstep. While some European countries, like Poland and the Baltics, scrambled to invest in defense and bolster their NATO commitments, the majority of Europe once again turned to the United States for security. For all of the European Union’s declarations of “strategic autonomy,” it became evident that the continent still expected the U.S. to act as its security blanket.
While the U.S. has responded decisively, Europe’s defensive posture remains alarmingly weak. Retired U.S. Lieutenant General Ben Hodges warned that NATO’s overall readiness for a large-scale conventional war with Russia is inadequate. On NATO’s eastern flank, which includes some of the territories most vulnerable to Russian aggression, there are only around 5% of the air defense capabilities required to deter or repel an attack. Europe’s incremental increases in defense spending and sporadic commitments to modernize military assets fall short of addressing these critical vulnerabilities.
Many fear that Trump might withdraw the U.S. from NATO, but the more likely scenario is that he will double down on his demands for burden-sharing. During his first term, Trump pushed for NATO members to fulfill their commitments to defense spending, a stance that was seen as undiplomatic but, in retrospect, was simply an insistence on fair contribution. This time around, Trump’s stance will likely be even tougher. He may insist that European nations pay their dues and exceed the 2% GDP target if they wish to count on American intervention under Article 5.
For Europe, the implications of Trump’s demands are daunting. If the continent does not take rapid, substantial action to increase its defense spending and preparedness, it could face the harsh reality of a diminished American security commitment. With the U.S. potentially less willing to absorb European defense costs, NATO’s collective defense principle may become conditional rather than guaranteed.
